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Abstract 
This paper provides an investigation of the impacts of pension funds on capital market 
development, both for stock markets and bond markets. For the overall sample of countries, 
we find that pension fund financial assets have positive impacts on stock market depth and 
liquidity as well as private bond market depth. However, when we split the countries into two 
groups according to their level of financial development, the impacts are only significant for 
countries with „high‟ financial development. Pension funds do not impact capital market 
development in the countries with a „low‟ level of financial development. These findings are 
based on a biased-corrected Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDVC) estimator. The results 
suggest that countries with 'low' financial development should reconsider the management 
approach and investment strategies for their pension funds.    
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The Role of Pension Funds in Capital Market Development 
1. Introduction 
Demographic change is a growing concern for both developed and developing 
countries. Increasing longevity and reduced fertility threaten the sustainability of traditional 
pay-as-you-go pension systems. The pension contributions from the working population will 
not be sufficient to support the elderly. In response, countries are increasingly shifting their 
pension systems toward partial or full funding. In addition to the main purpose of coping with 
demographic pressures and unsustainable fiscal positions, other motivations for countries to 
reform their pension systems often include the hope that funded pensions will contribute to 
economic development by promoting national savings and capital market development. In this 
study, we seek to determine the impacts of pension funds on the development of capital 
markets. This paper reaches further than previous studies by separating countries according to 
their level of financial development to account for potential heterogeneity in the results, by 
using new estimation techniques that have been shown to produce less bias, and by basing 
results on a larger panel dataset, both in terms of the number of countries and the number of 
time periods.  
The introduction of funded pension systems allows pension funds to accumulate assets 
that can be invested in financial markets. Even in the case that pension savings crowd out 
other household savings such that the total savings in the economy do not increase, the 
accumulation of pension fund assets is expected to potentially promote depth and liquidity in 
the capital markets because of the different investment behavior between households and 
pension funds. With accumulating assets and the longer-term nature of their liabilities, 
pension funds have incentives to invest more in illiquid and long-term assets that yield higher 
returns, and thus provide a long-term supply of funds to the capital markets (Davis, 1995). As 
well, Catalan, Impavido, and Musalem (2000) argue that with their stake in illiquid pension 
funds, households will increase their liquidity by holding deposits in the banking sector, open-
end mutual funds, and traded securities, at the expense of other illiquid assets such as real 
estate or non-traded financial instruments. Such behavior will also stimulate financial market 
development.  
Pension fund activities may also induce capital and financial market development 
through their substituting and complementary roles with other financial institutions, 
specifically commercial and investment banks. As competing intermediaries for household 
savings and corporate financing (as noted by Impavido, Musalem, and Tressel, 2002), pension 
funds foster competition and may improve the efficiency of the loan and primary securities 
markets. This results in a lower spread between lending rates and deposit rates, and lower 
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costs to access capital markets. On the other hand, Davis (1995) argues that pension funds 
may complement banks by purchasing long-term debt securities or investing in long-term 
bank deposits. Other potential impacts from the growth of pension funds include an 
inducement toward financial innovation, improvement in financial regulations and corporate 
governance, modernization in the infrastructure of securities markets, and an overall 
improvement in financial market efficiency and transparency (Davis, 1995). Such impacts 
should ultimately spur higher long-term economic growth.  
Some studies have sought to quantify the impacts of pension funds on capital markets, 
but the literature is still relatively sparse. Catalan, Impavido, and Musalem (2000) conduct 
Granger causality tests on 14 OECD countries and 5 developing countries, separately, to see 
the causal relationship between stock market development and contractual savings institutions 
including pension funds. They conclude that contractual savings predominantly Granger cause 
stock market development. To a lesser extent, the causality happens simultaneously between 
them, and very slightly, the causality runs the other direction. Even though they find such 
causal evidence, their estimation might suffer from the small number of time period 
observations. For example, the number of observations is only 6 for Austria, 8 for Portugal, 
and 9 for Australia.  
Impavido and Musalem (2000) study the impact of contractual savings and non-life 
insurance institutions on stock markets using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Error 
Component (EC), and Error Component Two Stage Least Squares (EC2SLS) estimators on a 
panel of 26 countries, 5 of which are developing countries. They find a statistically significant 
impact of contractual savings financial assets on stock market capitalization, but not on stock 
value traded.  
Walker and Lefort (2002) carry out a panel study using a Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) estimator for 33 emerging markets and find positive links between pension reform and 
capital markets. They find that pension fund assets reduce dividend yields and increase price-
to-book ratios, thereby implying a decrease in the cost of capital. However, they also admit 
that some of their estimation results may suffer severely from measurement error problems, 
and their conclusions are preliminary and need to be verified again when a longer period of 
observations becomes available.  
Impavido, Musalem, and Tressel (2003) incorporate dynamic panel models to estimate 
the impact of contractual savings institutions on stock market and bond market development. 
With the use of an Arellano and Bond (1991) differenced GMM estimator on 32 developed 
and developing countries, they find that contractual savings financial assets have significant 
impacts on stock market and bond market development. Nonetheless, with a small number of 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                                                              Discussion Paper: 10-17 
 
4 
 
cross-section units and short time periods (six years on average in their study), the GMM 
estimators suffer from potentially large finite sample bias.  
Identifying the impacts of pension funds on capital market development is important. 
The analysis requires a reliable estimation method to be convincing. In this paper, we employ 
the recently developed bias-corrected Least Squared Dummy Variable (LSDVC) estimator, 
which produces reliable estimates for dynamic panel data models with a finite number of 
cross-section units and time periods. This LSDVC estimator has been shown to outperform 
instrumental variable (IV) and GMM estimators in dynamic panel models in terms of bias and 
efficiency (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999). In addition to developing more reliable 
estimates, the other main contribution is the finding that the impacts of pension funds vary by 
a country's level of financial development. Though we find a significant impact of pension 
funds on capital market development in the overall sample, this result is driven by countries 
with „high‟ financial development. For countries with „low‟ financial development, pension 
funds do not show a significant impact. Countries with different levels of financial 
development have different financial market climates that can directly impact the role and 
performance of pension funds. Differences include pension fund investment regulations, 
market efficiency, transparency, the legal framework, market activities, and macroeconomic 
and financial conditions. The investment behavior and asset allocation of pension funds in the 
two types of markets are different, suggesting that countries with „low‟ financial development 
must do more to create conditions for their pension funds to positively impact capital market 
development. 
 
2. Methodology 
Though we use a different econometric estimation technique, we follow the basic 
methodological framework developed in Impavido et al. (2003). In this model, investors 
choose to between three assets: stocks, quasi-money (remunerated bank deposits, bills, and 
bonds) which bears interest, and non-interest bearing money. These three assets are 
substitutes for one another. Each investor determines personal demand for each type of asset, 
and the total demand function for each asset is the aggregated demand across individuals. We 
assume that each asset‟s supply is fixed, which is reasonable if the variation of the short-run 
supply is smaller than that of demand. Investors are rational and their demand functions 
depend on a set of factors including expected asset returns and risks, and institutional 
characteristics.  
With the panel structure of our data, we consider the following dynamic panel 
regression model, which allows for endogenous persistence of the dependent variable (by 
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incorporating the lagged dependent variable as an independent variable), unobserved country-
specific effects, and time-specific effects:    
 
        ittititititiit udfZVRYY   1,1,1,1, '''       (1) 
 
where itY  are indicators for either stock market development or bond market development, 
each of which will be estimated separately. 1, tiR  is a vector of explanatory variables 
characterizing the real returns for the three financial assets, and 1, tiV  is a vector characterizing 
their volatility or risk. 1, tiZ  is a vector of institutional features that affect financial markets, 
including the level of economic development and the size of pension funds relative to GDP. 
if  captures all unobserved country-specific fixed effects. td is a full set of year dummies to 
capture aggregate shocks. In this model, we use explanatory variables in lag form, which is 
natural if there is a causal effect from those variables to the dependent variable.  
For the estimation of this dynamic panel data model, OLS will produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates even though the error terms are not serially correlated. While the 
traditional fixed effect estimator can remove the unobserved country-specific time-invariant 
characteristics through variable transformation, bias and inconsistency still exist due to the 
correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error 
terms. Because of these problems, researchers have proposed alternative estimation methods. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose a first-difference transformation to eliminate individual 
effects, if , and employ 3,2,2,   tititi YYY or 2, tiY as an instrument for the transformed 
lagged dependent variable, 1,  tiY , which is correlated with the transformed error terms, itu . 
This instrumental variable estimation method produces consistent estimates as long as the 
itu are not serially correlated. However, this method does not necessarily yield efficient 
estimates.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a differenced GMM procedure that provides more 
efficient estimates by making use of additional instruments whose validity is based on the 
orthogonality between the lagged values of the dependent variable and the transformed error 
terms. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) later develop system GMM 
estimation, which uses the lagged difference of itY as instruments for equations in levels, in 
addition to the use of lagged levels of itY as instruments for equations in first differences. This 
improves the poor performance of the differenced GMM estimation in cases where the 
autoregressive parameter of itY approaches one and the sample periods are short.  
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However, a weakness of the IV and GMM estimators is that their properties only hold 
when there is a large number of cross-section units (N), and some bias and imprecision of the 
estimates may arise with a small size for N. This is the case for our panel as well as most 
macro panels. Moreover, Monte Carlo experiments by Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen 
(1999) show that IV and GMM estimators often have a larger variance than fixed effects or 
LSDV estimators. 
As such, the LSDV estimator with bias correction (LSDVC) has been considered as an 
alternative approach for dynamic panel data models with exogenous regressors when the 
number of cross-section units is relatively small, as it has been shown to outperform 
alternative estimators. Nickell (1981) derives an analytic expression for the inconsistency of 
an LSDV estimator for N . It is bounded on the order 1T . However, he did not consider 
any terms that contribute to bias resulting from a small N. Kiviet (1995) uses higher order 
asymptotic expansion techniques, terms of order 11  TN , to approximate the small sample 
bias of the LSDV estimator. With Monte Carlo experiments, he also shows that the resulting 
bias-corrected LSDV estimator, in many circumstances, outperforms the IV and GMM 
estimators in terms of bias and root mean squared error. Monte Carlo evidence from Judson 
and Owen (1999) also strongly support its superiority when N is small. Later, Kiviet (1999) 
derives a more accurate bias approximation with 21  TN  order terms. Bun and Kiviet (2003), 
after simplifying the approximation formula in Kiviet (1999), analyze the performance of 
Kiviet‟s approximations with Monte Carlo simulations and reveal that the first-order terms of 
the approximation already comprise around 90 percent or more of the true bias. The terms of 
order 11  TN and 21  TN  only lead to minor improvements. These procedures to correct for 
bias in LSDV estimators were applicable only for balanced panels. But, more recently, Bruno 
(2005) accommodates unbalanced panels with an exogenous selection rule. Monte Carlo 
results therein also parallel those in Bun and Kiviet (2003).  
With the unbalanced structure of our panels and the finite number of cross-section 
units and time periods, we will apply the bias-corrected LSDV estimation technique for 
unbalanced panels.
1
 We consider it to be the most appropriate and reliable estimator, 
compared to the existing IV and GMM estimators. But to demonstrate the robustness of our 
findings, we also compare estimates from the Arellano and Bond (1991) differenced GMM 
estimator.
2
  
                                                 
1
 In practice, bias-corrected LSDV requires initial consistent estimates for the bias-correction procedure. We opt 
for the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator as the initial estimator. 
2
 We do not use the system GMM estimator because the assumptions required for the additional moment 
conditions employed in system GMM are inappropriate for this study. The orthogonality assumptions between 
the lagged difference of the dependent variable and the fixed effects in the context of our study means that the 
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To pursue the other main objective of our study, which is to identify the difference in 
pension fund impacts for countries with different levels of financial development, we split the 
countries into two groups: „high‟ financial development and „low‟ financial development. To 
categorize such groups, we follow Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) to construct a 
conglomerate index by combining the standardized measures of five financial indicators: 
stock market capitalization over GDP, stock value traded over GDP, stock value traded over 
market capitalization, liquid liabilities (M3) over GDP, and credit provided to the private 
sector over GDP.
3
 We classify the countries into each group based on whether their index 
values are above or below the median index value across the countries. 
 
3. Data, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
We seek to measure the impact of pension fund financial assets on capital market 
development, investigating both stock markets and bond markets. To proxy stock market 
development, we use stock market capitalization over GDP (MC/GDP) and stock market 
value traded over GDP (VT/GDP), both of which are widely used indicators for stock market 
depth and liquidity, respectively. For bond markets, different from Impavido et al. (2003), we 
consider only private bond markets, rather than the combined public and private bond markets. 
Private bond market capitalization over GDP (PBMC/GDP) should serve as a better proxy for 
the development of financial markets, whereas public bond issuance largely depends on the 
government‟s fiscal position and other needs. Pension fund investment in public sector bonds 
may not represent a freely determined decision.  
Real rates of return and risks for the three groups of financial assets are controlled for 
and defined as follows. The real rate of return on stocks is defined as  1)1/()1(  dp , 
where p is the rate of change in the stock price index, d is the dividend yield, and  is the 
inflation rate. The real rate of return on quasi-money is defined as  1)1/()1(  i , where i 
is the nominal interest rate on deposits. The real return on money is proxied by the negative 
inflation rate. The risk measures for the real returns are calculated from monthly data as the 
ratio of within-year standard deviation of returns to the mean of the within-year real returns. 
The size of pension funds is measured in terms of pension fund financial assets as a 
proportion of GDP (PFFA/GDP). We also control for the overall development of the countries 
with a proxy of GDP per capita in constant dollars.  
                                                                                                                                                        
change in stock market depth and liquidity, change in private bond market depth, and changes in pension fund 
size are uncorrelated with slow-moving country-specific characteristics such as demographic structures, past 
policy choices regarding pension system design, and so on. This is inappropriate.  
3
 We also tried classifying the countries based on their stock market development using stock market 
capitalization over GDP, total stock value traded over GDP, and total value traded over market capitalization. 
For our sample of countries, the results of these classifications are the same.  
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The data on pension fund financial assets are from the OECD Institutional Statistical 
Yearbook, OECD Global Pension Statistics, and various national sources. Stock market 
capitalization, stock value traded, private bond market capitalization, and other 
macroeconomic and financial data are from the World Development Indicators, the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, the MSCI stock indices, and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine (2009). In this study, we cover 32 developed and emerging market countries. The 
panel data is unbalanced with an average length of 18.5 years per country. 
// Table 1 About Here // 
Table 1 provides the means of the selected variables over the sample periods used in 
our regressions for each country. Countries are classified by their level of financial 
development. The table shows that, relative to GDP, countries with a „high‟ level of financial 
development generally have a larger stock market capitalization, stock value traded, and 
private bond market capitalization, as well as more pension fund assets (on average, 104.6%, 
86.9%, 36.4%, and 40.4%, respectively) than the „low‟ level countries (on average, 38.6%, 
16.5%, 22.7%, and 12.6%, respectively).  
// Figure 1 About Here // 
Figure 1 shows the positive correlation between the average sizes of pension fund 
financial assets and the stock and bond markets during 2003-2007. We see the clear positive 
correlation between pension fund financial assets and stock market capitalization and value 
traded, with correlation coefficients of 0.7283 and 0.6424, respectively. In countries such as 
Australia, Finland, Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the 
financial assets held by pension funds account for more than 50% of the GDP, while the stock 
market capitalization and value traded are larger than 100% of the GDP. For bond markets, 
though, the correlation is positive but less prominent, as its value is 0.2330. 
// Figure 2 About Here // 
Figure 2 presents the association between the growth in pension fund financial assets 
and the growth in stock market depth, stock market liquidity, and private bond market depth 
between 2003 and 2007. Again, the relationships are positive, indicating that countries with 
faster growing pension funds also tend to witness higher growth for their stock and bond 
markets, though the relationship is less strong for bond markets. The correlations between the 
changes in pension fund financial assets and the changes in stock market capitalization, stock 
value traded, and private bond market capitalization are 0.4141, 0.3979, and 0.2126, 
respectively.  
 
4. Results 
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Though the previous discussion highlights the positive relationship between pension 
fund size and capital market development, regression analysis is required to know about the 
significance and causality behind this relationship. We estimate a dynamic panel data model 
by including the one-year lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, implying that 
our results focus on short-term dynamics. All the explanatory variables are used in lag form to 
avoid potential endogeneity problems and thus ensure that the direction of causality is from 
the explanatory variables to the dependent variable, but not vice versa.
4
 We use a bias-
corrected LSDV estimator. In addition, we provide the estimated results from the differenced 
GMM estimator as a check of the robustness.  
// Table 2 About Here // 
Table 2 provides the regression results for stock market capitalization, stock value 
traded, and private bond market capitalization estimated from the entire sample. The results 
from these bias-corrected LSDV estimators provide support that the growth of pension fund 
financial assets is positively associated with the growth of stock market capitalization, stock 
value traded, and private bond market capitalization. The size of the impacts is relatively large 
for stock markets compared to bond markets. For instance, a one percentage point increase in 
pension fund financial assets relative to GDP, on average, leads to 0.30 and 0.625 percentage 
point increases in stock market capitalization and stock value traded, respectively, in the next 
period, while private bond market capitalization (relative to GDP) increases by 0.094 
percentage points. The GMM estimators also provide similar patterns for pension fund assets, 
though the coefficients are larger than those obtained with the bias-corrected LSDV 
estimators.
5
  
As well, each regression shows a strong persistence of the dependent variable, as the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is strongly statistically significant. The 
coefficients for the lagged dependent variables estimated from GMM are smaller though, and 
this is consistent with the Monte Carlo experiments showing the negative finite sample bias in 
                                                 
4
 However, another issue about causality is the possibility that pension fund and capital market size may be 
jointly determined by other exogenous factors. These are commonly slow-moving factors, which include 
demographic structure, trade openness, level of economic development, and the legal framework, all of which 
capture the cross-country differences in explanations for the differing development of the capital markets and 
pension funds. In a separate appendix available upon request, we test whether or not these slow moving factors 
jointly determine our dependent and explanatory variables; that is, we want to show that our results are not a 
consequence of the joint determination by such exogenous factors. We find that the coefficient of the 
„exogenous‟ component of pension funds has a positive and statistically significant impact on stock market and 
private bond market capitalization, giving support that our results for the impact of pension funds on capital 
markets are not the outcome of the joint determination by other slow-moving factors. 
5
 For consistency of the GMM estimator, two specification tests are required: Test of autocorrelation and Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions. Our test results show that the hypothesis of 2
nd
 order autocorrelation for the 
transformed error terms is not rejected, indicating the non-existence of autocorrelation. The Sargan test also fails 
to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the moment conditions are satisfied. The results of these two 
specification tests support the validity of using the GMM estimator.  
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estimating the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables with GMM estimators (Judson 
and Owen, 1999; Kiviet and Bun, 2001). 
Other variables we control for are less commonly significant, but at least both 
estimation procedures lead to coefficients with the same signs. Focusing on the LSDVC 
estimates, real stock returns have a positive and statistically significant impact on stock value 
traded, yet are negative for bond market capitalization. This is expected, as higher real returns 
on stocks will induce higher demand and substitution away from bonds. Volatility for real 
stock returns shows negative association with stock market indicators but is positive for bond 
markets. However, it is only statistically significant for stock market capitalization. The 
coefficient of inflation is positive and statistically significant (at the 10 percent significance 
level) only for bond market capitalization, while inflation volatility has a negative association 
with all stock and bond indicators, but is statistically significant only for stock market depth. 
Meanwhile, the change in real interest rates and their volatility do not impact the capital 
market variables. GDP per capita, which controls for overall economic development in the 
country, is statistically significantly and positively associated with stock valued traded, but 
not with stock market and bond market depth.  
// Table 3 About Here // 
Overall, we have shown that the growth of pension fund financial assets leads to the 
development of stock markets and private bond markets for the data as a whole. Next, we 
seek to determine if the impacts of pension funds are different between countries with „high‟ 
and „low‟ levels of financial development. Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the results for stock 
market capitalization, stock value traded, and private bond market capitalization, respectively, 
for the two subgroups of countries classified with „high‟ and „low‟ financial development. 
From Table 3, the coefficient of pension fund financial assets (relative to GDP) is positive and 
statistically significant for countries with „high‟ financial development, giving support for the 
positive impact that pension funds have on stock market depth. However, this coefficient is 
smaller and not statistically significant for countries with „low‟ levels of financial 
development. The impact of pension fund financial assets on stock market liquidity, as shown 
in Table 4, is strongly significant only in countries with a „high‟ level of financial 
development as well. Again, the impact is insignificant in countries with „low‟ development. 
Table 5 similarly shows that pension funds help stimulate the development of private bond 
market depth only for the „high‟ development countries. The findings also suggest that the 
growth of pension funds has a larger impact on stock markets than on private bond markets. 
For instance, a one percentage point increase in pension fund financial assets over GDP in 
countries with „high‟ financial development leads, on average, to an increase in stock market 
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capitalization and stock value traded as a proportion of GDP of 0.397 and 0.488 percentage 
points, respectively. Private bond market capitalization increases by 0.114 percentage points.  
// Table 4 About Here // 
The GMM estimation results provide similar interpretations, as we just described, 
which demonstrates the robustness of our findings, though in every case GMM produces 
larger impacts for pension funds than do the bias-corrected LSDV estimators. One difference 
is that for countries with „low‟ financial development, the impact of pension funds is 
statistically significant for bond markets as well. This was not found with the more reliable 
LSDVC estimates.  
// Table 5 About Here // 
5. Conclusion 
As a result of pension system reform, pension fund assets are growing rapidly and are 
increasingly providing a source of investment funds to their domestic financial markets. 
Pension fund investments are expected to increase the availability of long-term funds, 
enhance competition, induce financial innovation, and improve corporate governance. To the 
extent that such financial market improvements are related to financial market size and 
activity, our study confirms only to an extent the existence of positive impacts from pension 
funds on the development of stock markets and private bond markets. Overall, we find that 
the impact of pension funds on capital market development differs significantly according to 
country‟s level of financial development. In the short run dynamics of capital markets, the 
countries with well-developed financial systems generally can expect to enjoy significant 
benefits from the growth of their pension funds, while the evidence of such benefits is much 
less clear for countries with 'low' financial development. 
These findings suggest that as a whole, the countries with 'low' financial development 
are not doing enough to take advantage of their pension funds. Examples in Iglesias and 
Palacios (2000) and Vittas (2000) suggest that pension assets in many countries are used to 
finance government deficits or to reward politically connected but inefficient investment 
projects without impacting the country's development or growth. Vittas (2000) further argues 
that for pension funds to have a positive impact on capital market development, they need to 
reach sufficient size, their regulations must allow for a variety of investments and not 
otherwise prohibit investments in equities, and optimal investments must be pursued. As well, 
investment options in 'low' development countries are often riskier, which can otherwise deter 
pension fund investments that could stimulate financial markets. Raddatz and Schmukler 
(2008) also cite for the case of Chile that the large size of the pension fund relative to 
domestic financial markets, and the buy-and-hold strategies employed by pension funds, may 
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decrease the overall trading volume of securities. The findings here provide quantitative 
support for these explanations. 
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Table 1: In-Sample Country Means for Selected Variables 
Country  Periods  MC/GDP % 
VT/GDP 
(%) 
PBMC/ 
GDP (%) 
PFFA/ 
GDP (%) 
Real 
Stock 
Return   
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Real 
Int. 
Rate 
(%)  
Financial 
index 
High Financial Development Countries 
Australia 1988-2008 87.06 54.89 28.72 55.49 7.39 3.32 2.50 0.12 
Canada 1980-2008 72.52 40.39 21.53 39.75 8.84 3.73 1.40 0.23 
Finland 2001-2008 112.04 145.47 23.00 60.51 -3.88 1.77 0.87 0.28 
Germany 1980-2008 31.60 35.68 45.61 3.04 10.22 2.41 1.99 0.11 
Italy 1990-2008 34.69 37.20 37.09 4.13 6.35 3.33 0.56 -0.02 
Japan 1980-2007 74.81 50.13 43.86 13.44 7.63 1.25 0.58 0.58 
Korea 1989-2008 50.32 94.99 47.46 8.27 9.90 4.58 2.94 0.57 
Malaysia 1989-2008 163.94 70.90 40.80 46.86 10.39 3.04 1.87 0.15 
Netherland 1980-2008 73.56 71.98 43.44 81.48 12.61 2.53 1.13 0.68 
Singapore 1989-2008 166.49 90.29 15.88 58.98 8.62 1.80 0.44 0.40 
South Africa 1994-2008 186.13 66.29 13.10 50.91 10.39 6.66 3.99 0.20 
Spain 1994-2007 72.21 111.01 24.54 7.11 15.89 3.21 0.38 0.54 
Sweden 1990-2008 89.39 86.49 48.01 2.76 13.65 2.54 1.13 0.28 
Switzerland 1999-2007 259.29 240.13 36.82 98.86 5.64 0.93 0.20 1.24 
United Kingdom 1980-2008 105.77 81.69 15.59 57.85 8.73 4.77 1.00 0.67 
United States 1980-2008 93.94 113.11 96.77 57.48 9.23 3.85 2.39 0.95 
Average  104.61 86.92 36.39 40.43 8.85 3.11 1.46 0.44 
Low Financial Development Countries 
Agentina 1996-2007 39.75 3.87 6.58 8.52 20.85 6.09 4.32 -0.75 
Austria 1993-2008 23.90 10.80 34.99 3.07 7.56 2.06 0.48 -0.35 
Begium 1980-2008 45.12 12.95 44.41 3.01 13.07 3.16 2.75 -0.23 
Chile 1989-2008 89.42 10.27 15.91 44.57 18.14 8.41 3.73 -0.41 
Colombia 1994-2008 21.54 2.26 0.50 5.49 19.38 11.41 4.63 -0.79 
Czech Republic 1996-2008 24.88 14.73 6.96 2.88 16.24 4.40 -0.99 -0.50 
Denmark 1988-2008 48.62 32.32 112.52 21.78 13.14 2.39 1.81 -0.07 
Hungary 1996-2008 25.65 19.49 2.93 5.08 20.08 9.49 1.05 -0.48 
Israel 2001-2008 81.58 46.49 
 
54.16 4.24 1.96 2.64 -0.17 
Mexico 1997-2008 26.32 7.67 11.71 4.59 14.05 8.35 -1.48 -0.74 
Norway 1981-2006 28.66 21.34 21.41 5.06 12.18 4.28 2.07 -0.16 
Peru 1994-2008 33.94 4.30 3.11 7.59 22.53 5.96 0.99 -0.75 
Poland 1999-2008 24.97 9.12 
 
6.33 7.56 3.91 2.02 -0.66 
Portugal 1989-2008 32.11 20.25 20.30 9.35 5.29 4.95 1.18 -0.08 
Sri Lanka 1994-2008 15.32 2.54 
 
15.84 6.08 10.68 -0.97 -0.76 
Thailand 2000-2008 56.12 45.40 13.86 4.71 10.06 2.82 -0.36 -0.08 
Average  38.62 16.49 22.71 12.63 13.15 5.64 1.49 -0.44 
Note: The data for PBMC/GDP is available only since 1990 and is not available for Israel, Poland, and Sri Lanka. 
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Table 2: Impact of Pension Funds on Capital Markets 
 
MC/GDP VT/GDP PBMC/GDP 
  GMM LSDVC GMM LSDVC GMM LSDVC 
Explanatory Variables are Lagged 
Lagged dependent variable 0.548*** 0.639*** 0.630*** 0.720*** 0.839*** 0.956*** 
 
(0.0459) (0.0437) (0.0519) (0.0445) (0.0494) (0.0347) 
PFFA/GDP 0.350*** 0.301** 0.750*** 0.625*** 0.112*** 0.0939** 
 
(0.111) (0.147) (0.257) (0.188) (0.0293) (0.0389) 
Real Stock Returns 0.0310 0.0341 0.142* 0.140** -0.0216** -0.0190* 
 
(0.0475) (0.0566) (0.0754) (0.0673) (0.0106) (0.0102) 
Real Stock Volatility -0.294*** -0.276* -0.219 -0.221 0.00863 0.00210 
 
(0.106) (0.160) (0.337) (0.193) (0.0193) (0.0258) 
Inflation -0.316 -0.250 1.026** 0.592 0.0254 0.135* 
 
(0.471) (0.442) (0.506) (0.514) (0.133) (0.0779) 
Inflation Volatility -3.524*** -3.428** -0.512 -0.450 -0.242 -0.466 
 
(0.872) (1.376) (0.825) (1.624) (0.280) (0.295) 
Real Interest Rate -0.380 -0.334 0.787 0.542 0.139 0.139 
 
(0.519) (0.528) (0.702) (0.627) (0.116) (0.103) 
Real Interest Volatility 2.564** 2.375 0.501 0.803 0.0817 0.0374 
 
(1.220) (1.673) (1.314) (1.988) (0.286) (0.276) 
GDP/Capita -6.31e-06 -3.49e-06 3.27e-05* 2.67e-05*** 5.38e-06** 1.69e-06 
 
(1.25e-05) (7.26e-06) (1.73e-05) (9.42e-06) (2.13e-06) (1.22e-06) 
                     
Observations 528 560 528 560 413 442 
Groups 32 32 32 32 29 29 
Test of 1st order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.0326 
 
0.0032 
 
0.0145 
 Test of 2nd order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.8998 
 
0.5668 
 
0.1226 
 Sargan Test (p-value) 0.4485 
 
0.8040 
 
0.1058 
               
Note:  -    Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of GMM are heteroskedastic-robust, and the standard errors of 
LSDVC have been derived by setting the number of bootstrap repetitions to 100. Year dummies are also included. ***, **, * signify 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Impact of Pension Funds on Stock Market Capitalization 
 by Level of Financial Development 
  
HIGH 
  
LOW 
Financial Development Financial Development 
  GMM LSDVC   GMM LSDVC 
Explanatory Variables are Lagged 
MC/GDP 0.581*** 0.654*** 
 
0.495*** 0.579*** 
 
(0.0438) (0.0590) 
 
(0.0808) (0.0628) 
PFFA/GDP 0.459*** 0.397** 
 
0.299 0.237 
 
(0.135) (0.190) 
 
(0.301) (0.243) 
Real Stock Returns 0.0333 0.0416 
 
0.0134 0.0146 
 
(0.111) (0.131) 
 
(0.0375) (0.0411) 
Real Stock Volatility -0.367** -0.367 
 
-0.132 -0.132 
 
(0.177) (0.238) 
 
(0.0938) (0.119) 
Inflation -1.230 -1.257 
 
-0.233 -0.231 
 
(0.959) (1.292) 
 
(0.393) (0.304) 
Inflation Volatility -0.522 0.0260 
 
-3.919*** -3.930*** 
 
(2.856) (4.711) 
 
(0.980) (0.854) 
Real Interest Rate -0.616 -0.525 
 
-0.563 -0.577 
 
(0.863) (1.190) 
 
(0.378) (0.381) 
Real Interest Volatility 0.0304 -0.437 
 
3.301** 3.215*** 
 
(3.483) (4.490) 
 
(1.385) (0.945) 
GDP/Capita -6.70e-06 -2.60e-06 
 
6.02e-06 5.58e-06 
 
(2.06e-05) (1.16e-05) 
 
(5.24e-06) (9.10e-06) 
                  
Observations 306 322 
 
222 238 
Groups 16 16 
 
16 16 
Test of 1st order  
0.0434 
  
0.0290 
 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
Test of 2nd order  
0.8959 
  
0.1821 
 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
Sargen Test (p-value) 1.0000 
  
1.0000 
             
Note:  -    See note in Table 2. 
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Table 4: Impact of Pension Funds on Stock Value Traded 
 by Level of Financial Development 
  
HIGH 
  
LOW 
Financial Development Financial Development 
  GMM LSDVC   GMM LSDVC 
Explanatory Variables are Lagged 
VT/GDP 0.646*** 0.728*** 
 
0.546*** 0.635*** 
 
(0.0613) (0.0588) 
 
            (0.0937) (0.0657) 
PFFA/GDP 0.602** 0.488** 
 
0.0332 0.0311 
 
(0.271) (0.238) 
 
(0.0769) (0.146) 
Real Stock Returns 0.213 0.217 
 
0.0531* 0.0530** 
 
(0.176) (0.162) 
 
(0.0295) (0.0258) 
Real Stock Volatility -0.447 -0.435 
 
-0.0826* -0.0798 
 
(0.643) (0.295) 
 
(0.0450) (0.0734) 
Inflation 1.008 0.992 
 
0.0719 0.0612 
 
(1.197) (1.620) 
 
(0.165) (0.190) 
Inflation Volatility 0.885 0.691 
 
0.0255 -0.00751 
 
(3.766) (5.859) 
 
(0.256) (0.530) 
Real Interest Rate 0.814 0.701 
 
0.143 0.140 
 
(1.592) (1.484) 
 
(0.184) (0.235) 
Real Interest Volatility -0.312 -0.637 
 
0.218 0.205 
 
(5.158) (5.572) 
 
(0.397) (0.589) 
GDP/Capita 3.30e-05 2.80e-05* 
 
2.22e-05*** 1.83e-05*** 
 
(2.79e-05) (1.52e-05) 
 
(3.58e-06) (6.83e-06) 
                  
Observations 306 322 
 
222 238 
Groups 16 16 
 
16 16 
Test of 1st order  
0.0044 
  
0.0115 
 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
Test of 2nd order  
0.6603 
  
0.5635 
 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
Sargen Test (p-value) 1.0000 
  
1.0000 
             
Note:  -    See note in Table 2. 
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Table 5: Impact of Pension Funds on Private Bond Market Capitalization 
by Level of Financial Development 
  
HIGH  
  
LOW  
Financial Development Financial Development 
  GMM LSDVC   GMM LSDVC 
Explanatory Variables are Lagged 
PBMC/GDP 0.889*** 0.944*** 
 
0.803*** 0.968*** 
 
(0.0475) (0.0378) 
 
(0.0711) (0.0747) 
PFFA/GDP 0.151*** 0.114*** 
 
0.182** 0.0833 
 
(0.0300) (0.0368) 
 
(0.0824) (0.0975) 
Real Stock Returns -0.0457*** -0.0358** 
 
-0.00979 -0.00744 
 
(0.0155) (0.0151) 
 
(0.0110) (0.0111) 
Real Stock Volatility 0.0321 0.0130 
 
-0.0161 -0.00789 
 
(0.0322) (0.0366) 
 
(0.0141) (0.0319) 
Inflation -0.0824 0.169 
 
0.0149 0.0657 
 
(0.179) (0.183) 
 
(0.133) (0.106) 
Inflation Volatility 0.199 -0.0161 
 
-0.562* -0.646* 
 
(0.769) (0.775) 
 
(0.306) (0.338) 
Real Interest Rate 0.261 0.374** 
 
0.0385 0.00742 
 
(0.248) (0.176) 
 
(0.0731) (0.129) 
Real Interest Volatility -0.991 -0.813 
 
0.400 0.306 
 
(0.638) (0.761) 
 
(0.276) (0.252) 
GDP/Capita 7.94e-06*** 1.94e-06 
 
4.05e-06 1.65e-06 
 
(2.77e-06) (1.87e-06) 
 
(3.29e-06) (1.75e-06) 
            
      Observations 241 257 
 
172 185 
Groups 16 16 
 
13 13 
Test of 1st order  
0.0291 
  
0.1886 
 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
Test of 2nd order  
0.4480 
  
0.0594 
 
autocorrelation (p-value) 
Sargen Test (p-value) 0.3852 
  
0.7637 
             
Note:  -    See note in Table 2. 
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Figure 1 : Average Pension Funds Financial Assets (PFFA), Stock 
Market Capitalization (MC), Valued Traded (VT), and Private Bond 
Market Capitalization (PBMC), 2003-2007 
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
COLCZE
DNK
FIN
DEU
HUN
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MYS
MEX
NLD
NOR
PER
POL
PRT
SGPZAF
ESP
LKA
SWE
CHE
THA
GBRUSA
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
M
C
/G
D
P
0 .5 1 1.5
PFFA/GDP
 
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
COL
CZE
DNK
FIN
DEU
HUN
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MY
MEX
NLD
NOR
PER
POL
PRT
SGP
ZAF
ESP
LKA
SWE
CHE
THA
GBR
USA
0
1
2
3
V
T
/G
D
P
0 .5 1 1.5
PFFA/GDP
 
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
COL
CZE
DNK
FIN
DEU
HUN
ITA
JPN
KOR
MYS
MEX
NLD
NOR
PER
PRT
SGP
ZAF
ESPSWE
CHE
THA GBR
USA
0
.5
1
1
.5
P
B
M
C
/G
D
P
0 .5 1 1.5
PFFA/GDP
 
Source: OECD Statistics, WDI,  IFS, and national sources 
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Figure 2 : Changes in Pension Funds Financial Assets (PFFA), Stock 
Market Capitalization (MC), Valued Traded (VT), and Private Bond 
Market Capitalization (PBMC) between 2003-2007 
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Source: OECD Statistics, WDI, IFS, and national sources 
 
 
  
 
